Indiana Injury Blog

Under Indiana law, when approaching a stationary authorized emergency vehicle that has its emergency lights activated, all motor vehicle drivers are required to proceed with "due caution" in yielding the right-of-way by changing into a lane not adjacent to that of the authorized emergency vehicle, "if on a highway having at least four (4) lanes with not less than two (2) lanes proceeding in the same direction as the approaching vehicle." See IC 9-21-8-35(b)(1). If a motor vehicle driver is unable to safely change lanes, Indiana law requires drivers to reduce the speed of their vehicle, while still maintaing a speed that is safe for the current road conditions. See IC 9-21-8-35(b)(2).

Please be careful and remember the law when encountering stopped emergency vehicles on Indiana roadways.

Posted by Parr Richey Obremskey & Morton | Permalink | Email This Post

Posted In: Highway & Traffic Safety , Indiana Laws

Bookmark:

Indystar.com has reported that Indiana State Police trooper Jeff Woodward was injured early Sunday morning while assisting a motorist changing a tire on southbound Interstate 465 near Rockville Road. Woodward had parked his patrol car, with its emergency lights activated, behind the car he was assisting when a driver rear-ended his patrol car. Upon impact, the patrol car was knocked into the car Woodward was assisting, which then struck him causing injuries to his back and legs.

According to Indystar.com, a young woman was cited in causing the accident for reckless driving, failure to yield to an emergency vehicle, speeding, having an unexpired plate, having no driver's license with her, and unsafe lane movement.

Under Indiana law, motor vehicle drivers are required by statute to change lanes or reduce their speed when approaching an emergency vehicle stopped with its emergency lights on.

Click here to read the article on Indystar.com.

Posted by Parr Richey Obremskey & Morton | Permalink | Email This Post

Posted In: Highway & Traffic Safety , Motor Vehicle Accidents

Bookmark:

On a rehearing of the matter, the Indiana Court of Appeals recently affirmed its decision in Estate of O'Neal v. Bethlehem Woods Nursing Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 878 N.E.2d 303, 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), that the Indiana Wrongful Death Act's ("WDA") two-year statute of limitation, which begins at the date-of-death, controls over Indiana's professional services two-year statute of limitation, which begins at the time of the occurrence. See Newkirk v. Bethlehem Woods Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC (Estate of O'Neal), (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (June 10, 2008) (opinion on rehearing), 2008 WL 2346138.

In its petition for rehearing, the petitioners argued, among other things, that the similarities in text and purpose between the Indiana professional services statute of limitation and the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act's ("MMA") two-year, occurrence based statute of limitation requires the Indiana Court of Appeals to conclude that the Indiana professional services statute of limitation controls over the Indiana WDA's statute of limitation.

The Indiana Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that even though the professional services statute of limitation has similarities in its text and purpose to the Indiana MMA's statute of limitation, the legislative goals of the MMA constitute a far more comprehensive means of accomplishing certain legislative goals. Thus, even though the MMA's statute of limitation controls over the WDA's statute of limitation, the professional services statute of limitation does not control over the WDA's statute of limitation.

Click here to read the opinion.

Posted by Parr Richey Obremskey & Morton | Permalink | Email This Post

Posted In: Civil Litigation , Indiana Court of Appeals Decisions , Personal Injury Litigation

Bookmark:

In deciding two matters of first impression, the Indiana Supreme Court recently held that a trampoline may constitute an attractive nuisance and that a parent/landowner may be liable for injuries of a minor sustained on the parent/landowner's property, when the parent/landowner's minor child invites the other minor onto the property. Click here to read the Indiana Supreme Court's opinion in Kopczynski v. Barger.

In Kopczynski, a twelve-year-old girl was invited by her neighbor's minor child to jump on a trampoline in the neighbor's back yard and subsequenlty injured her knee while on the trampoline. The trampoline was located in an unenclosed area behind the neighbor's house and the children were jumping on the trampoline without adult supervision.

The trial court granted the parent/landowner's motion for summary judgment on the injured girl's claim for liability under the attractive nuisance doctrine and premises liability, determining that the girl was a trespasser and that the attractive nuisance doctrine was not applicable. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's determination.

The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, holding that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the injured girl was an invitee on the property, opposed to a trespasser. Additionally, the Court used expert testimony that stated unenclosed trampolines on private property "are particularly attractive to children," that knee injuries are a common result of trampoline use and additional testimony stating the injured girl was not warned of the dangers of the trampoline in determining that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the trampoline in this case constitued an attractive nuisance.

Posted by Parr Richey Obremskey & Morton | Permalink | Email This Post

Posted In: Civil Litigation , Indiana Supreme Court Decisions , Personal Injury Litigation , Premises Liability

Bookmark:

Indiana's Southern Federal District Court recently ruled in favor of plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's expert witness's testimony, determining that defendant's expert witness's failure to disclose the previous cases in which he provided expert testimony violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) and this violation was prejudicial to the plaintiff. See Wallace v. Hounshel, 2008 Lexis 44977 (S.D. Ind.) (May 22, 2008).

In its order, the Court explained that FRCP 26(a)(2)(B) mandates that expert witnesses disclose to opposing counsel during the discovery process "a list of all other cases in which, during the previous four years, the witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition." However, the defendant in this case argued that under FRCP 37(c)(1), the expert's testimony should still be allowed, as the failure to disclose was harmless to the plaintiff.

Ultimately, the Court held that defendant's failure to disclose the other cases in which their expert gave an opinion was prejudicial for the reasons that it prevented the plaintiff from determining whether the expert was credible and from seeing if the expert was giving "inconsistent positions" in the case at hand compared to previous cases.

Posted by Parr Richey Obremskey & Morton | Permalink | Email This Post

Posted In: Civil Litigation , United States District Court - Southern District for Indiana Decisions

Bookmark:

In Owen v. State, 796 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), the owner of Chervrolet Blazer was stopped by a police officer at a seatbelt checkpoint when the officer noticed the owner was not wearing his seatbelt. While the officer was in the process of issuing the owner a seatbelt ticket, the owner argued that his Blazer was registered as a truck and exempt from the seatbelt requirement pursuant to Indiana statute. Despite the owner's Blazer being registered as a truck, the trial court found it not to be a truck and affirmed the issuance of the ticket.

On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals noted that IC 9-19-10-2 states that drivers and front-seat passengers in "passenger motor vehicles" are required to keep their seatbelts fastened, and that IC 9-13-2-123 defines a "passenger motor vehicle" as "a motor vehicle designed for carrying passengers." The Indiana Court of Appeals noted, however, that Indiana statute excludes "truck, tractors, and recreational vehicles" as "passenger motor vehicles." Furthermore, the Indiana Court of Appeals stated a truck is defined as "a motor vehicle designed, used, or maintained primarily for the transportation of property" under IC 9-13-2-188.

In giving the applicable statutes their plain and ordinary meaning, the Indiana Court of Appeals held "the definition of 'truck' does not necessarily exclude SUVs, and if an SUV owner has paid the fee for a truck plate, then by law he drives a truck that is specifically excluded from the seatbelt law." Additionally, the Indiana Court of Appeals stated "[i]f an SUV owner does not have a truck plate, then by law he does not drive a truck but instead drives a passenger vehicle that is subject to the seatbelt law."

Applying its holding to the case at hand, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, stating the owner's Blazer was licensed as a truck. Therefore, Indiana's seatbelt statute did not apply.

Posted by Parr Richey Obremskey & Morton | Permalink | Email This Post

Posted In: Highway & Traffic Safety , Indiana Court of Appeals Decisions , Indiana Laws

Bookmark:

As of this morning, the National Weather Service has listed 24 Indiana counties under a flood warning and Daviess county remains under a flash flood warning. Click here to view the National Weather Service's county-by-county warnings and advisories for the flood conditions in Indiana.

With forecasters calling for additional heavy rain throughout the rest of the week, it is important to remember that flood conditions and flash flood situations can create driving hazards, leading to serious injury or death. Flooded roadways are extremely dangerous to drive through and, if at all possible, need to be avoided. The conventional wisdom surrounding motor vehicles and flood conditions is that it only takes a foot of water to float a vehicle, six inches of water may reach the bottom of your vehicle causing operating problems and hydroplaning, and two feet of rushing water can cause your vehicle to be swept off of the roadway in the direction of the current.

Please be careful traveling on the roadways, as we continue to battle these flood conditions.

Posted by Parr Richey Obremskey & Morton | Permalink | Email This Post

Posted In: Highway & Traffic Safety , Motor Vehicle Accidents

Bookmark:

Indiana's Hospital Lien Statute, IC 32-33-4-1 et seq., allows a hospital to hold a lien against an injury claim. When properly perfected, this lien applies to any amount recovered by the patient.

The hospital must record its lien in the county where the hospital is located within 180 days after the patient is discharged, and, within 10 days of recording, must provide notice of the lien to (1) the tortfeasor, (2) the patient's attorney, and (3) the Indiana Department of Insurance.

Despite the statute explicitly requiring a hospital to provide the patient's attorney with actual notice of the lien's existence, the Indiana Supreme Court has determined that, in certain situations, constructive notice will suffice. To avoid personal liability, search the Recorder's Office for any hospital liens prior to disbursing any funds in a personal injury claim.

Posted by Parr Richey Obremskey & Morton | Permalink | Email This Post

Posted In: Civil Litigation , Indiana Laws , Personal Injury Litigation , Tips for Attorneys

Bookmark:

Tony Patterson was named Indiana Trial Lawyer of the Year at the November 1, 2007, Indiana Trial Lawyers Association ("ITLA") 43rd Annual Institute at the Indiana Roof Ballroom in Indianapolis. The annual award is given to an attorney who exemplifies the foundation of ITLA's mission and who has shown distinguished service to the citizens of Indiana and the United States as a leading member of the Indiana Trial Bar and dedication to the rights of the injured under the laws of the State of Indiana and the United States of America. Congratulations Tony!

Posted by Parr Richey Obremskey & Morton | Permalink | Email This Post

Posted In: Civil Litigation , Parr Richey Obremskey & Morton , Personal Injury Litigation , Tony Patterson

Bookmark:

A Greyhound bus carrying 41 passengers crashed on Interstate 65 in northwest Indiana. According to the Chicago Tribune, 29 of the passengers required medical treatment. The bus was on its way from Chicago to Nashville Tennessee when it flipped on its passenger's side and came to rest near the median. It is unsure why the crash occurred, although witnesses said the bus appeared to be traveling at a high rate of speed and it is suspected that the driver may have fallen asleep.

Posted by Parr Richey Obremskey & Morton | Permalink | Email This Post

Posted In: Highway & Traffic Safety , Motor Vehicle Accidents , Parr Richey Obremskey & Morton , Personal Injury Litigation , Tony Patterson

Bookmark:

The Indiana Court of Appeals handed down a decision on Monday, in Stanley v. Walker, holding write-offs constitute insurance benefits for purposes of the collateral source rule. In its opinion, the Indiana Court of Appeals reasoned "that write-offs constitute insurance benefits for which the plaintiff has paid directly, and therefore, defendants cannot be allowed [to] introduce evidence of write-offs to reduce damage awards" pursuant to Indiana's collateral source statute. The majority concluded that these benefits "should inure to the benefit of the plaintiffs," as they had the forethought to carry insurance and make the required premium payments.

In Stanley, the plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sustained medical bills stemming from his injuries in the amount of $11,569.99. However, due to write-offs negotiated by his insurance company, this gross amount was significantly adjusted downward. At trial court, defendant acknowledged he could not introduce evidence of or ask plaintiff about the amount of his medical expenses that were being paid for through his insurance coverage. However, defendant sought to introduce evidence of the write-offs arranged by plaintiff's insurance coverage. Plaintiff objected and the trial court sustained the objection citing Indiana's collateral source statute.

Click here to see the Indiana Court of Appeals opinion in Stanley v. Walker.

Posted by Parr Richey Obremskey & Morton | Permalink | Email This Post

Posted In: Civil Litigation , Indiana Court of Appeals Decisions , Personal Injury Litigation

Bookmark: